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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
the former would seem more desirable, and more in keeping with the true
concepts of municipal powers. The decision of the case in question is
correct, but the Public Service Commission Act is wrong in this respect,
*P.J. D.
and should be amended.
SALES-PASSING

OF TITLF-APPROPRIATION OF GooDs By VENDR-

Thompson-Weber Co. contracted to pack and sell F. O B. sellers' place
1,000 cases of tomatoes for Jos. A. Goddard Co. during the canning season
of 1927. Credits which Jos. A. Goddard had with Thompson-Weber Co.
were to be applied as payment in part. On Oct. 15, Thompson-Weber Co.
had packed 950 cases, put Goddard's label on them, and set them aside in
a separate pile. He notified Goddard of this act and also stated that he would
ship the next day, which was the 16th of October. On Oct. 16 one Craig
Brokerage Co. offered to buy and had Thompson-Weber ship the 950 cases
to them under a bill of lading. Craig Brokerage Co. accepted the draft
sent them knowing that the goods bore Goddard's labels, and then took
possession of the goods. This action is by Jos. Goddard Co. in replevin v.
Craig Brokerage Co. Held-The terms "F. 0. B. sellers place" in the contract relate only to price and not to time title passes. By appropriation
or setting aside, the title to the 950 cases passed to the buyer and the subsequent sale to the appellant gave him no title to the tomatoes. Craig
Brokerage Co. v. Jos. A. Goddard Co., 175 N. E. 19 (Ind.App. 1931).
Title is accompanied with several incidents which are of considerable
importance in the law of sales. The most important incident is the risk
of accidental loss or damage. In a sale the law presumes, unless a contrary intention of the parties appears, that the risk was intended to follow
title as an incident to it. Williston on Sales, Ed. 2, Sec. 302, Jessup v.
Fairbanks, 38 Ind. App. 673, 78 N. S. 1050. As a matter of illustration,
when the title remains in the seller, for other than security purposes, the
risk of accidental losses or damage is on the seller; and, likewise, when
title passes by virtue of the sale to the buyer, he must bear the risk, Foley
v. Felrath, 98 Ala. 176, 13 So. 485; Strauss Saddle Co. V. Kingman, 42
Mo. App. 208; Allyn v. Buor, 37 Ind. App. 223, 76 N. E. 636. The right to
sell is another very important incident of title and it is the only one involved in the instant case. It necessarily follows that one who has title
to goods may by sale transfer title'to a buyer; but, as a general rule, after
title has passed to the buyer the seller may no longer transfer title to a
third party. Incidentally, there is a well recognized exception to the rule.
If retention of possession by the seller is found, as a question of fact for
the jury, to be fraudulent as against creditors and bona fide purchasers,
a third party who relies upon the fraudulent possession of the seller in
purchase of the goods will prevail in title as against the buyer who allowed
the possession to remain in the seller. Burns, 1926, 8050. See Rose v.
Colter, 76 Ind. 590; Hardy v. Mitchel, 67 Ind. 485; Noble v. Hines, 72 Ind.
12; Spaulding v. Blythe, 72 Ind. 93; Powell v. Stickney, 88 Ind. 310; Rinn
v. Rhodes, 93 Ind. 389. Also, Seavy v. Walker, 108 Ind. 87, 9 N. E. 347;
Higgins v. Sparr, 145 Ind. 167, 43 N. E. 11. Williston on Sales, Ed. 2,
See. 311. Also as an incident of title there must be added the right of
creditors to possess themselves of the goods to which their debtor has title.
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Martin v. Adams, 104 Mass. 262. Since these incidents follow title, our
concern is to locate title; and, then, the legal effect of these incidents will
result to title wherever it may rest.
Title to goods not yet manufactured can not be presently passed for
the parties can not by their acts pass title to goods which do not exist.
Gile v. Laselle, 89 Ore. 107, 171 P. 741. Then a contract to pack or manufacture goods in contemplation of the law of sales is nothing more than
a contract to sell when the goods come into existence. Herring Motor Co.
v. Aetn= Trust Co., 87 Ind. App. 83, 154 N. E. 29. The title to the goods
manufactured may pass on their coming into existence if the parties expressly state such intention in the contract of sale or when such intention
can reasonably be inferred from the contract. Clarkson V. Stevens, 106
U. S. 505; Coddington v. Turner, 85 Ind. App. 604, 139 N. E. 323. But
the buyer rarely expresses his intention in so many words and out of this
fact arises the problem of ascertaining his intention. In this plight the
law comes to our aid with the presumption that title to goods just completed
by the seller under a contract to sell does not pass without some subsequent
act of appropriation assented to by the parties. Enterprise Wall Paper
Co. v. Milson Rantoul Co., 260 Pa. St. 540, 102 Atl. 923; Churchhill Grain
Co. v. Newton, 88 Conn. 130, 89 A. 1121; Proctorand Gamble Co. v. Peters,
233 N. Y. 57, 124 N. E. 849; Fordic v. Gibson, 129 Ind. 7, 28 N. E. 303.
Again the buyer seldom states expressly just what act by the seller will be
a sufficient appropriation, so it is necessary to resort to inferences from
the terms and circumstances of the bargain. Williston on Sales, 2 Ed.,
p. 558. The buyer's assent may be inferred from a course of business between the parties. Bundy v. Meyers, 148 Minn. 352, 181 N. W. 345. Or
from mere setting the goods aside, the buyer is said to impliedly consent
without notice of the act. Atkinson v. Bell, 8 Bern. & C. 277; Western Hat
& Manufacturing Co. v. Berkner Bros., 172 Minn. 4, 214 N. W. 475;
Andrew v. Cheney, 62 N. H. 404. Most jurisdictions will require an express acknowledgment by the buyer after he is informed of the seller's act
in setting the goods aside (appropriation) for him. Winslow Bros. &
Smith Co. v. Universal Coat Co., 252 Mass. 7, 146 N. E. 713; Soss Manufacturing Co. v. Mitchel Motors Co., 196 N. Y. S. 304; Coddington v.
Turner, 85 Ind. App. 604, 139 N. E. 323; Herring Motor Co. v. Aetna
Trust Co., 87 Ind. App. 83, 154 N. E. 29; Fordic v. Gibson, 129 Ind. 7, 28
N. E. 303. In the instant case the seller informed the buyer that the goods
were packed and set aside or, in other words, had been appropriated to
the contract. The buyer did not reply to the notice, but even with such
facts there are numerous cases supporting the view that the buyer impliedly assents to the appropriation unless he dissents within a reasonable
time. Berkshire Cotton Mfg. Co. v. Cohen, 236 N. Y. 262, 140 N. E. 726;
Win. Whiteman Co. v. Whitcomb, 204 N. Y. S. 417; Acme Wood Carpet
Flooring Co. v. Braddock (facts almost identical to the principal case)
203 N. Y. S. 554. Payment, as made in the instant case, is another important item to be taken into consideration in determining the time the
buyer assents to an appropriation of the goods. One who pays for goods
ordinarily desires title at the earliest opportunity to prevent possible loss
from bankruptcy of the seller, seizure by creditors of the seller, or a
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fraudulent sale by the seller; so it was held in Hopkins v. Brnaugh, 281
Fed. 799, that a purchaser who pays in advance assents impliedly to take
title when the seller sets aside the newly manufactured goods. The added
fact, in the instant case, that the seller labeled the cans as those of the
buyer also strongly supports the contention that the seller intended to
appropriate the goods to the buyer. Sift v. Wright & Weslosky Co., 113
Ga. 681, 39 S. E. 503; Mitchel v. La Claire, 98 Mass. 152. On authority,
the court is correct in deciding that title passed to the buyer when the
goods contracted for were labeled and set aside and the buyer given notice
of the appropriation.
It is the general rule that title does not pass by appropriation unless
the goods appropriated by the seller conform to the contract in kind,
quality and quantity. Richardson v. Dunn, 2 Q. B. 218; Sutherland Medicine Co. v. Baltimore, 81 Ark. 229, 98 S. W. 966; Downs v. Marsh, 29 Conn.
409; Weil v. Stone, 33 Ind. App. 112, 69 N. E. 698. In the instant case
the contract called for 1,000 cases of tomatoes and the seller appropriated
but 950 cases to the contract. At first blush this casts some doubt on the
court's opinion in the case, but it might well be successfully argued in
favor of the decision that the buyer assented in advance to take title to
each can as it was labeled and set aside by virtue of the fact that the
buyer had paid in advance and had his labels placed on the cans as soon
as they were packed. Title by such a contention, would pass to any number of cans that the seller finished regardless of the fact that the contract
called for 1,000 cases. But if one does not wish to go to this degree to
support the case, it can be forcefully argued for the same reason that title
passed to every case that was set aside as the goods of the buyer.
The appellant says that the legal presumption as to the passage of title
is overcome in the instant case by an expression in the contract of sale
that title shall pass only on delivery to the buyer. He insists that the
words "F. 0. B. sellers place" in the contract of sale reveal an intention
not to pass title until the goods are at least put in the hands of a carrier
for shipment to the buyer. In the light of authority, unless some other
expression of intention appears, the mere presence of an F. 0. B. provision
does not affect the question of when title passes to the buyer. The terms
F. 0. B. should be construed to mean nothing more than that the price of
the goods should include the freight charges from the seller's shipping
point to the buyer's. Sterling Coat Co. v. Silver Springs, etc., Co., 162 Fed.
848, 89 0. C. A. 520; Barnett & Record Co. v. Fall, 62 Tex. Civ. App. 391,
131 S. W. 644; Standard Casing Co. v. California Casing Co., 233 N. Y.
214, 135 N. E. 834; U. S. v. Andrews, 207 U. S. 229, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 100.
The principal case is not decided under the sales act which was adopted
in Indiana in 1929, but undoubtedly the same result would be reached had
the decision been controlled by the act.
J. B. E.

